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PREFACE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24
was established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the
negotiating strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the
international financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country
grouping within the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing
countries.
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional
reform.
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee)
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums.
The Project of Technical Support to the G-24 receives generous financial support
from the International Development Research Centre of Canada and contributions from
the countries participating in the meetings of the G-24.THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS:
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Abstract
In recent years the IMF has made efforts to build an improved “crisis prevention and
resolution framework” that minimizes the size and frequency of bailouts, largely out of
a concern with the possible moral hazard consequences of its interventions. This
framework, however, which includes an emphasis on greater private sector involvement,
the encouragement of the use of collective action clauses and a more effective enforcement
of access limits to IMF lending has not generated an observable change in practice.
The institution may be trying to achieve an almost impossible objective: imposing more
stringent criteria to constrain its intervention capacity without recognizing that such an
approach is ultimately inconsistent with the IMF’s intrinsically political nature. This is
clearly evidenced in the cases of countries that have to restructure their debts. The
failure of the SDRM project reflected, among other factors, the prevailing view in the
United States administration that market forces should be relied on to find an “solution”
in these situations almost on their own. But this has in practice meant that the IMF
relinquishes its potential contribution to improving the result of sovereign debt
restructurings. In fact, the IMF has frequently exerted pressure on the debtor and its
views have often been biased in favour of the creditors’ interests. In particular, its lending
into arrears policy (LIA) has been used as a means to induce debtor governments to
“accommodate” to these interests. But by providing financing to the debtor through its
LIA policy the Fund could potentially play a positive role in reducing the gap between
the creditors’ “reservation price” and the country’s repayment capacity while, at the
same time, making sure that the debt burden becomes sustainable. In this way, both
debtor countries and its creditors would be better off. However, the Fund should not
support “market-friendly” sovereign debt restructurings that are incompatible with
sustainable debt paths and may represent a greater risk for its resources than more
“coercive” alternatives. Indeed, the paradox is that “investor friendly” debt restructurings
represent quite the opposite of a market outcome: they require active and often massive
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Negotiations between creditors and a sovereign
debtor can become a long-drawn-out and costly proc-
ess that delays the recovery of the debtor country
without generating any “compensating” advantage
for the holders of the defaulted claims. This sug-
gests there is a potential constructive role that could
be played by the IMF in both pre- and post-default
situations, by pushing for an orderly restructuring
process which attempts to strike a balance between
the rights of creditors and debtor at the same time
that it mitigates the collective action problem. The
so-called statutory approach to debt restructurings,
which was reflected in the development of the Sov-
ereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM),
might have become one of the pillars of an improved
“crisis resolution framework”. However, this ap-
proach faced strong opposition and could not be put
into effect, though the “threat” of its possible imple-
mentation has probably exerted pressure on market
participants to adopt collective action clauses (CACs),
in what has been labelled the “contractual” approach
to debt restructurings.
Among the “interest groups” opposed to the
SDRM was not only the investor community, whose
opposition could reasonably be expected, but also
the very middle-income countries that were supposed
to eventually be able to benefit from it. Debtors’
countries reluctance to support the SDRM should
not be surprising since, in the IMF’s view, the SDRM
was an instrument that would make it possible to
precipitate earlier defaults in those cases where the
debt was deemed to be unsustainable, with the aim
of reducing the frequency and scale of bailouts and
attenuating moral hazard. This considerably de-
creased the incentives of debtor countries to support
the IMF but, more fundamentally, reflected the adop-
tion by the Fund of an approach that, under the guise
of “market-friendly” rhetoric, is both suboptimal and
inconsistently applied.
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This approach is reflected in the so-called
“framework for crisis prevention and resolution”, the
name given by the IMF to the set of policies, instru-
ments and criteria that establish the “rules of the
game” in the cases of sovereign crises, and which
includes an emphasis on greater private sector in-
volvement (PSI), the encouragement of the use of
CACs and a more stringent enforcement of access
limits to IMF lending. As originally envisaged it
would have obviously included the SDRM, if it had
been put into effect. But, as we know, this did not
happen. On the contrary, the IMF continued with its
market-friendly approach and implemented changes
in its lending into arrears (LIA) policy which will
impose greater costs on both lenders and sovereign
debtors.
If minimizing moral hazard is considered to be
the preeminent objective, a “pure” market-based or
laissez faire approach could indeed be preferable to
other alternatives, and the Fund should adopt a strict
hands-off stance. However, the empirical evidence
shows that the relevance of moral hazard has been
exaggerated but, regardless of this fact, the IMF has
not been doing what it preaches. It has been incon-
sistent in its own terms by frequently intervening in
the negotiations between creditors and the debtor
country, often generating “outcomes” that are far
from being the natural result of the free operation of
market forces, and which may have a detrimental
impact on the debtor’s long-term economic prospects.
Its participation in post-default restructurings,
in particular, has not been confined to fulfilling the
role of expert, via the supply of information and
analyses. On the contrary, through its role as “moni-
tor”, the IMF has frequently exerted pressure on the
debtor and its views have generally been biased in
favour of the creditors’ interests. In particular, its
lending into arrears policy (LIA) has been used as a
means to induce debtor governments to “accommo-
date” to these interests. This is somewhat contradic-
tory, in turn, with the academic consensus on the
higher prevalence of creditor (as opposed to debtor)
moral hazard in the current “international financial
architecture”.
In effect, an important issue is the extent to
which “market-friendly” sovereign debt restructur-
ings are compatible with sustainable debt paths. The
approach used by the IMF to assess debt sustain-
ability, despite some improvements in recent years,
is not robust enough and may underestimate the risks
faced by debtor countries, particularly when adverse
shocks are positively correlated and persistent, as
has often been the experience in developing coun-
tries. Moreover, the IMF has shown a systematic
tendency to be overoptimistic in its debt sustain-
ability assessments. If sustainability is not reason-
ably assured, there is a risk that market-friendly
restructurings may not facilitate the country’s ac-
cess to international capital markets in the medium-
and long-term, even if they are initially greeted with
approval by the investor community.
There is indeed an inescapable trade-off be-
tween “investor-friendliness” and debt sustainability.
But by providing financing to the debtor through its
LIA policy the Fund could play a positive role in
reducing the gap between the creditors’ “reservation
price” and the country’s repayment capacity, thus
generating a “Pareto improvement” that leaves both
debtor and creditors better off. Instead, it seems to
be placing too much emphasis on ancillary but
largely useless criteria, such as the sovereign’s com-
pliance with the “good faith” criterion.
This paper will discuss the role that the IMF
plays in sovereign debt restructurings and its views
regarding the various components of the “framework
for crisis prevention and resolution”, with a special
emphasis on LIA policy and the issue of debt
sustainability. Because the SDRM was originally
intended to be one of the pillars of such framework
and because of the consequences of the debate it
generated, the first section examines the reasons that
explain the failure of the SDRM project to make
progress. The second section comments on the re-
cent widespread adoption of CACs, to a large extent
as a result of the “threat” posed by the possible im-
plementation of the SDRM. Sections three to six deal
with LIA policy. They explain the objectives and
implications of LIA policy as well as its evolution
over time, discussing the suitability of the criteria
that regulate its implementation, how the policy has
been applied in practice and the relevance of the
moral hazard problems that it might generate. In sec-
tion seven, and against the background of the
trade-off between investor-friendliness and debt
sustainability, the potential positive role that the IMF
could play in debt restructurings is discussed and is
contrasted with the Fund’s failed experience in Ar-
gentina and its bailout of Uruguay, which was clearly
inconsistent with its own rules.13 The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
I. The SDRM project nobody liked
The circumstances could not have been more
propitious when the IMF started its work on the
SDRM in late 2001. The idea of limiting bailouts
and enforcing access limits had been gathering
strength since Mexico’s 1995 “rescue” package but
this new policy orientation required that sovereign
debtors do not postpone entering into restructuring
negotiations until it was too late, in a desperate ef-
fort to “gamble for resurrection”. The debtors’
countries reluctance to restructure early was under-
standable, though, given that the growing diversity
of the creditor base and the variety of the debt in-
struments involved seemed to pose a challenge to
the objective of achieving a rapid agreement between
the parties at a reasonable cost.2 Official attempts to
improve the “technology” used for restructuring
sovereign debts had failed, beginning with the en-
couragement of the adoption of CACs by the “Rey
Report” (Group of Ten, 1996), so there was some frus-
tration about the lack of “spontaneous” progress of
market-based solutions. At the same time, there was
a growing consensus about the need for a mecha-
nism that could deal effectively with the collective
action and creditor coordination problems that the
predominance of bonded debt exacerbated. In addi-
tion, the dismal failure of the IMF’s policy in
Argentina, and the country’s imminent default, was
an stimulus for work on the SDRM since, in the view
of many, the complexity of the case called for pre-
cisely the sort of structured restructuring process that
the envisaged SDRM could provide, instead of a
more “chaotic” decentralized framework.
However, though the conditions were seem-
ingly favourable for the birth of the SDRM, the
initiative had to overcome deeply entrenched views
against it, including the United States Government’s
traditional opposition to schemes which could limit
creditors’ rights in the international sphere.3 The
United States Treasury had never been in favour of
an international bankruptcy court, mainly based on
the argument that it would encourage default. So it
is unlikely that the IMF would have embarked on
the development of its SDRM proposal were it not
for the brief “window of opportunity” provided by
Paul O’Neill’s period at the helm of the United States
Treasury. In this regard, the abandonment of the
SDRM project at the Spring 2003 meeting of the
International Monetary and Financial Committee
(IMFC) is not surprising, because the actual imple-
mentation of the scheme was from the start an event
with a very low probability of occurrence. However,
after O’Neill gave the initial impulse, the IMF’s
machinery was set in motion, and a proposal was
drafted anyway, under the enthusiastic leadership of
Anne Krueger.
O’Neill did not represent Wall Street’s inter-
ests and views, and this may explain why he saw the
idea of an SDRM with less prejudice than other
members in the administration. He was against
bailouts and saw an orderly “bankruptcy procedure”
as the obvious alternative to them.4 But the institu-
tion he supposedly commanded would not work on
the project. The United States Department of Treas-
ury would never issue an official policy statement
or an official document outlining a proposal for the
SDRM and the Treasury’s Undersecretary for Inter-
national Affairs, John Taylor, publicly opposed the
initiative. Instead, he favoured a “market-based”
approach consisting in stimulating the widespread
inclusion of collective action clauses in bond con-
tracts, as an alternative to the “contractual” approach
represented by the SDRM. The terminology is cer-
tainly misleading and looks like a marketing device,
because the functioning of modern capital markets
obviously depends on the legal infrastructure, which
is a public good that increases overall economic ef-
ficiency. So the correct label should probably have
been “investor-friendly”, since the approach fa-
voured by Taylor, who did not believe in radical
reforms in the international financial architecture,
was the one preferred by the financial community.
O’Neill would have acknowledged defeat if he
had cancelled all work on the topic, so he put for-
ward the so-called two-track approach, under which
both alternatives would coexist for some time, and
which was more palatable for the Government of
the United States. According to O’Neill, the con-
tractual approach would be the first to be imple-
mented and the SDRM would become a complement
to the former in the long term:
... The IMF will continue to develop a plan
for the official sector approach, which will take
some time because of the IMF rules. I will be
encouraging them every step of the way. But
we will also begin to implement the market-
oriented, decentralized aspect of the plan right
away, to capitalize on the consensus among
the G-7 nations. Creditors and borrowers can4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 40
begin immediately to incorporate contingent
clauses into their sovereign debt contracts,
such as a majority action clause, an engage-
ment clause, and an initiation clause.5
But in essence, the SDRM project was already
dead. What explains the lack of progress towards
the implementation of the SDRM? Why was it not
possible to garner enough support for it? After all,
the SDRM’s objective (Krueger, 2002) is to make
possible an “orderly, predictable and rapid restruc-
turing of unsustainable sovereign debt”, something
that can hardly be rejected by any of the parties af-
fected by a sovereign debt crisis. If those objectives
were achievable they would all be better off, since
the SDRM would make it possible to get closer to
an “optimal” balance between ex-ante and ex-post
efficiency, by increasing the latter at the expense of
a probably modest reduction in the former.
The United States position alone does not ex-
plain the stagnation of the SDRM project, which had
the important support of the European countries’
representatives in the IMF’s Executive Board. It is
true that O’Neill’s lack of backing inside the United
States Government, which was evident from the be-
ginning, would deprive the SDRM of any serious
chances of being implemented. However, the aban-
donment of the SDRM project was not only the result
of opposition by the United States Government.
Nearly all the “actors” whose interests would have
been directly affected by the SDRM opposed its
implementation, in some cases because they disliked
specific elements of the proposal, but there was also
more fundamental opposition to the very concept of
an international bankruptcy court and the belief that
there was no need for it.
Investors and underwriters of sovereign bonds,
particularly in the United States, were the most vig-
orous opponents to the SDRM, arguing that it would
encourage default, though they would not go as far
as to acknowledge that their interests were much
better served by IMF bailouts.6 Borrowing countries,
in particular the major Latin American nations with
the exception of Argentina (for obvious reasons),
worried that the SDRM would negatively affect their
ability to issue debt in the international capital mar-
kets, because it would lead to an increase in the risk
premia for emerging market issuers. Even more im-
portantly, they feared that the implementation of the
SDRM might be accompanied by a reduction in their
access to IMF’s “rescue” packages. In their view,
the potential benefits of the SDRM, particularly its
weak legal protection of debtors’ rights,7 could not
make up for the loss of emergency access to multi-
lateral financing. Finally, debtor countries were also
reluctant to give up their sovereignty in matters like
the legal treatment of debt issued under their do-
mestic laws and the legal powers that the Dispute
Resolution Forum (DRF) would have to impose a
stay.8
So neither creditors nor debtors9 wanted to lose
the option of being bailed out10 in exchange for a
mechanism of doubtful efficacy, whose enforcement
might not be feasible anyway. And from the perspec-
tive of creditor countries and the IMF, the main use
of a well-functioning SDRM is precisely to limit
bailouts,11 by encouraging the debtor country to re-
structure its debt as soon as it becomes unsustainable.
In effect, the IMF’s staff view (Hagan, 2005) was
that the SDRM would serve to limit bailouts in situ-
ations were the sovereign is involved, as opposed to
a situation of illiquidity, where IMF financing may
be the right option. But given the high costs of de-
fault, no country would follow this course unless it
was clear that IMF financing would not be avail-
able. Thus, while no mandatory quantitative limits
to IMF lending were included in the SDRM pro-
posal, it was understood that compliance with the
Exceptional Access Framework (EAF) would limit
expectations of a bailout and, together with the
SDRM, would enable the Fund to better resist po-
litical pressures to provide assistance.
This “political economy” dimension of the
SDRM debate is interesting in its own right and has
shown the significant difficulty of reaching a con-
sensus at the international level, given the diversity,
and most often conflicting, interests of the different
parties. This difficulty was reflected in the evolving
nature of the proposal, as its developers attempted
to accommodate to the demands of opposing con-
stituencies, among which was the IMF itself. In the
end, the final version of the SDRM fell short of rep-
resenting a substantial “revolution” in the interna-
tional financial architecture, as some had expected.
But, was it reasonable to expect such revolution in
the first place? Could a technology transferred from
the quite different corporate context be successfully
applied in the sovereign context? Could the IMF play
simultaneously the role of judge, umpire, legislator
(it was the sole SDRM designer) and creditor? Did
it not have obvious conflicts of interest? If the SDRM
cannot satisfactorily replicate the features of corpo-
rate bankruptcy law, why would any party accept it5 The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
in exchange for more tangible legal rights or de facto
capacities?
Indeed, the “intellectual” battle between the
opposing positions in the SDRM debate was fought
along the lines marked by the unique characteristics
of the sovereign context vis-à-vis the corporate con-
text.
As is well known, the SDRM loosely resem-
bles the “centralized” model in Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. The central aim of
the SDRM is thus to resolve the problem of inter-
creditor equity and the legal challenges posed by
“holdouts” (which can disrupt negotiations) while
moderating, at the same time, the negative impact
that the mechanism may have on creditors’ contrac-
tual rights. There are four crucial features that the
SDRM “borrowed” from the bankruptcy code,
though their scope, need, and the possibility of en-
forcing their application are not comparable in the
sovereign context:12
• A stay on creditor litigation, which protects the
debtor and addresses the collective action prob-
lem among creditors.
• A vote by a qualified majority on a restructur-
ing plan that binds all creditors.
• The reorganization plan can give seniority to
new financing (this is the so-called debtor-in-
possession financing or DIP).
• The debtor is legally prevented from entering
into transactions that would be harmful to credi-
tors’ interests.
The IMF largely concentrated on making the
first of the above features effective in the SDRM,
and sought for an adequate scheme that could in-
crease the leverage of creditors as a group over
individual creditors, so that the risk from holdouts
would be minimized. IMF staff believed that the
other features of an usual (domestic) bankruptcy
framework were less relevant in the sovereign con-
text.13 But mimicking the majority voting mechanism
that exists in the corporate context is difficult, and
implied a trade-off between assuring that the cover-
age of debts was comprehensive and keeping the
complexity of the SDRM within reasonable bounds.
Besides, increasing the degree of coverage often
implied restricting the debtor’s sovereignty.
This was especially relevant regarding the treat-
ment of domestic debt. The alternative of putting it
within the scope of the SDRM, but as a separate class,
was rejected partly out of concerns that it would have
been considered too intrusive and would have gen-
erated strong opposition. No government or domestic
legislature would be willing to adopt the SDRM if it
could be used to restructure domestic debts. As Hagan
(2005) has remarked:
A number of countries could not accept the
possibility that debt issued within their own
territories and subject to their own laws could
be restructured under a legal framework that
would be administered by an international dis-
pute resolution body. Even among mature
market countries - who were very unlikely to
avail themselves of the SDRM to restructure
their debt - there was likely to be a concern
that the domestic legislature would be unwill-
ing to adopt the SDRM if there was even the
remotest possibility that it could be used to
restructure domestic debt.
The IMF eventually proposed that the sover-
eign debtor be required to identify those debts that
would be restructured through the SDRM’s single
aggregated vote, separating them from those claims
that would be restructured “outside” (debts to the
Paris Club and part of the domestic debt) and those
that would be totally excluded from the restructur-
ing (trade-related debts, debts to the IFIs, etc.). Under
this scheme, it is possible, even likely, that the
amount of claims to be restructured “outside” the
SDRM may exceed the amount to be restructured
“inside”. However, the proposed mechanism is a
realistic option, taking into account the fact that, as
the recent Argentine case shows, the sovereign debtor
most often needs to establish its own de facto rank-
ing of priorities in a crisis situation, and will decide
which creditors will be paid and which will not so
as to minimize domestic economic hardship.
Naturally, the investor community was galvanized
and strongly opposed a scheme whereby it was forced
to subordinate its claims beyond what, in their view,
could be reasonably accepted. They believed the pro-
posal narrowed the amount of “eligible” debt so much
that the restructuring terms could only be harsh, since
the non-privileged private creditors would bear all
the costs associated with the needed reduction in the
sovereign’s unsustainable debt burden. And any fi-
nancing provided by the IMF or other IFIs before a
default would now have not just a de facto but a
“legally sanctioned” seniority over private debts.6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 40
Another feature of corporate law that could not
be satisfactorily included in the SDRM was the stay
on creditor litigation, which was a conflictive issue
that generated much of the initial resistance to the
SDRM.
In effect, the first version of the mechanism (as
presented by Krueger in November 2001) envisaged
a restructuring process that would start with the
debtor country formally requesting the IMF to acti-
vate the SDRM and impose the stay on the sovereign’s
outstanding debt obligations. If the request was ac-
cepted and endorsed by the Fund (which had to assess
the sustainability of the country’s debt) the stay on
enforcement was to be “automatically” put into ef-
fect, in a way similar to the procedure in corporate
bankruptcy law.
The fact that the IMF was empowered to de-
cide whether a stay was necessary or not was one of
the aspects of the proposal that faced stronger oppo-
sition in the investor community, which feared that
it would create a strong incentive for debtors to de-
fault. Moreover, the financial private sector doubted
the impartiality of the IMF and the extent to which
its judgments would be based exclusively on eco-
nomic criteria, fearing that political considerations
might play an important role.
The IMF itself also became concerned that the
“automatic” stay would shift too much legal leverage
from creditors to the sovereign and wanted to mini-
mize the risk of debtor moral hazard, so it gave in to
investors’ demands. In later versions of the SDRM,
a stay or standstill on a specified action requires the
approval of a qualified majority of creditors or it can
be implemented if requested by the sovereign debtor
and approved by both a creditors’ committee and
the SDRM decision maker (IMF, 2003a and 2003b).
This change deprived debtor countries of pro-
tection from creditor litigation, so it clearly reduced
the attractiveness of the SDRM from their viewpoint.
However, the “rush to the courthouse” that justifies
a stay in the corporate context is less of a concern in
the sovereign context, where it lacks speed and faces
uncertainty. In fact, creditors have argued that sov-
ereigns in default have too much legal protection,
not too little.
In this regard, recent experience in sovereign
debt restructurings and the evolution of legal prac-
tice certainly put into question the relevance or
(differential) practical impact of a formally declared
stay, at least if the main concern is that of prevent-
ing holdouts from disrupting the restructuring
process. In this regard, judge Griesa of the Southern
District of New York, where lawsuits against Argen-
tina are presented, has said:14
... the Republic ... made very broad waivers
of sovereign immunity, agreed to jurisdiction
in this Court, and presumably that was sup-
posed to mean something ... What has been
demonstrated by these lawsuits is how little it
means ... The Republic has done everything
possible to prevent the collection of these debts
... Can there be any recovery on the judg-
ments? So far it looks as if it is virtually hope-
less ... But what it illustrates is that these law-
suits may ultimately be illusory ...
Judge Griesa’s words reflect that the ability of
holdouts to disrupt a sovereign debt restructuring
process is now perceived to be lower than it was
some years ago. If the sovereign takes all the neces-
sary precautions the feasibility of attaching any of
its assets is almost nil, so the debtor can provide it-
self with a de facto stay. It is currently acknowledged
that the famous Elliot vs. Peru case,15 which seemed
to imply that the threat of holdouts was consider-
able, was wrongly interpreted at the time by most
analysts. In fact, had the Government of Peru waited
for a few days it would have been able to pay through
Euroclear without problems. In the end, in 2005
Belgium’s parliament approved a law which would
have made the Elliot strategy impossible. There re-
mains the risk that the interpretation of the pari passu
clause could be broadened. But the recent trend has
rather been the opposite, towards a narrower inter-
pretation of it.
Interestingly, some of the protection afforded
to debtor countries, as in the mentioned case of Ar-
gentina, might be interpreted as originating in
specific groups which belong to the private finan-
cial sector but whose interests are opposed to those
of the creditors. This is, for example, the case with
Euroclear. Belgium’s Government has sought to pro-
tect its importance in the international payments
system, and the associated fees, by preventing any
weakening of its reliability. Similar considerations,
preserving the market share and fees of the New York
capital market “brand”, may explain the “amicus cu-
riae” (friend of the court) presented to judge Griesa
in support of Argentina by the Association of Clear-
inghouses in the United States and by the Federal
Reserve.167 The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
In addition to the decreased disruptive capac-
ity of holdout creditors, there are other reasons why
a stay may not be as fundamental, which are a con-
sequence of the specific characteristics that differ-
ence the sovereign from the corporate context. In
the first case, it is difficult to enforce the general
cessation of payments from the debtor to any credi-
tors that is the counterpart to the stay on creditor
enforcement, and any solution to this problem would
undermine the principle of sovereignty. Given that
in the SDRM the claims subject to restructuring
would be identified by the sovereign, which may
plan to continue to service certain debts left “out-
side” the SDRM, inter-creditor equity would require
that the stay be implemented only after a vote by the
creditors affected (Hagan, 2005).
But a creditor-approved stay would not be prac-
tical either, because the sovereign would not be
protected from litigation until creditors have already
voted on an aggregated basis, which may demand
considerable time. These led the IMF to seek for an
alternative that could generate some of the same in-
centives as a stay, and in the final version of the
SDRM the so-called “hotchpotch” rule was in-
cluded.17 However, it is an imperfect substitute for a
stay, since it does not preclude litigation by credi-
tors, even if it does discourage them from choosing
that option. Another alternative, consisting of im-
posing a “targeted”, rather than a generalized stay,
was considered by the IMF, but it required increas-
ing the role of the DRF, which would determine
if the risk from litigation justified the measure.
Again, because it implied giving more power to a
supranational entity this option was deemed un-
feasible.
The other characteristic feature of corporate
bankruptcy law, the possibility of providing financ-
ing to the debtor that is legally considered senior to
the other claims cannot be satisfactorily replicated
in the sovereign context either. It requires that credi-
tors authorize through majority voting the exclusion
of certain “DIP” financing from the SDRM, though
unlike the case in the corporate context, they would
not even then have the guarantee that their priority
will be respected by the sovereign. Consequently,
even if the SDRM was internationally adopted, the
IMF, through its LIA policy, would in practice still
be the only provider of financing for a country in
default. As will be discussed later, this is an una-
voidable characteristic of the international financial
architecture that cannot be modified.
Leaving aside the lack of support for the
SDRM, it is clear that the “final product” was much
more limited in its scope than originally envisaged
(Truman, 2005). The coverage of debts would be so
narrow that, in practical terms, it would be restricted
to the sovereign’s bonded debt,18 and the debtor
would not be really protected from litigation, so its
incentives to implement the SDRM will be modest.
Not even the role of the IMF would change much, if
at all, particularly with regard to its lender of last
resort function before default and its LIA policy af-
ter a default.
Hence, it is natural to question whether the
implementation of the SDRM (in its final version)
(IMF, 2003b) would really improve the sovereign
debt restructuring process as compared to the status
quo, characterized by unilateral exchange offers.
II. The SDRM and the market’s love
for CACs
Does this mean that the SDRM project has only
been a mere intellectual exercise that will be rel-
egated to the dustbin of the history of economic
ideas? Not necessarily, as there have been several
positive consequences of the debate around the
SDRM, not least the improvement in the understand-
ing of the technical issues involved and the pressure
it has put on the private sector to include collective
action clauses in bond contracts.
Indeed, the SDRM may have made possible the
recent expansion in the use of CACs in debt con-
tracts. In a letter from the International Institute for
Finance to Chancellor Gordon Brown as Chairman
of the International Monetary and Financial Com-
mittee (IMFC), the private financial sector’s position
was stated as:
... continued official support for the “two
track” approach involving both CACs and a
sovereign debt restructuring mechanism
(SDRM) runs the serious risk of undermining
efforts to advance contractual changes.
The letter also said:
We would encourage the official community
to concentrate its energies on advancing with
the private sector and issuer efforts already
under way to put in place CACs, not to thwart
or jeopardize those efforts.8 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 40
Under strong opposition, particularly from the
investor community, the SDRM project was thus
cancelled, but the difficulties faced in trying to de-
vise satisfactory solutions to some of its technical
problems undoubtedly facilitated its demise. At its
Spring 2003 meeting the IMFC concluded that it was
not (“now”) feasible to establish it. Consequently,
the Fund abandoned the two-track approach and
decided to focus exclusively on gradual reform meas-
ures along the lines of the “contractual” approach.
The hypothesis that the SDRM “menace”
prompted the private sector to abandon its previous
reluctance to adopt CACs is persuasive. In effect,
already in May 1996, on presenting The Resolution
of Sovereign Liquidity Crises or “Rey Report”,19 the
G-10 had encouraged the widespread use of collec-
tive action clauses.20 The report acknowledged that
for the success of these efforts the inclusion of CACs
should be a process driven by the market but stated
that it would receive official support.
But the private sector remained uninterested in
promoting the use of CACs and the clauses were not
introduced, despite the official sector’s encourage-
ment of reform in market practices. What happened
that made the private sector change its mind after
seven years of neglecting the G-10’s proposal?21 It
is difficult not to attribute this change to the pres-
sure of the official sector which, in the end, had to
be the driving force behind the adoption of CACs,
to the point that it took the initiative of designing
model clauses. The private sector realized that a
staunch opposition would lead to the official sector
promoting even harsher remedies, the SDRM, to deal
with the problem of sovereign debt restructuring. It
is, nevertheless far from certain that the threat of the
SDRM becoming a reality was believable, but in the
creditors’ views what mattered was the fact that,
some way or the other, the official sector would adopt
a tougher line with respect to creditors’ interests than
before.
However, though the private sector eventually
adopted collective action clauses in New York law
bonds and claimed to support them, it fought a “rear-
guard action” to limit their impact as much as
possible. In effect, the private financial community
came up with quite different proposals regarding
collective action clauses than those that had been
recommended by the Report of the G-10 Working
Group on Contractual Clauses. Creditor groups tried
to figure out how to include collective action clauses
without actually reducing the capacity to hold out in
a restructuring, with the obvious objective of mak-
ing bonds even harder to restructure. This turns out
not to be difficult and these groups came up with
their own set of model clauses, which they recom-
mended to be included as the standard.22
At a very general level, this set of model clauses
is broadly similar to that of the G-10 Working Group
on Contractual Clauses (Group of Ten, 2002; and
BIS, 2003). But “the devil is in the details”. The
“Gang of Seven” proposals of model clauses differ
from that of the G-10 in two important respects.23
They essentially consist of increasing the majority
needed to amend a bond’s non-financial terms while,
at the same time, tolerating the amendment of the
bond’s financial terms, but requiring a very signifi-
cant majority to do so (90 per cent or higher). This
actually makes it more difficult, not easier, to re-
structure bonded debt. First, by augmenting the
necessary majority for amending the bond’s non-fi-
nancial terms it diminishes the feasibility of using
the so-called “exit consents”24 in a debt restructur-
ing, which have often been used in exchange offers
as a means of providing a de facto seniority to the
new bonds over the original claims. Second, though
the unanimous support of the bondholders is no
longer required to amend the bond’s financial terms,
by establishing a very high minimum majority this
“qualitative” change becomes worthless in practice,
because it has a very low probability of ever being
put into effect.
In short, and not surprisingly, what the private
international financial community has in mind, when
discussing ways of improving the process of restruc-
turing sovereign debts, are mechanisms to strengthen
their sector’s bargaining power at the expense of the
debtor country. In particular, in designing their pro-
posals, creditors’ efforts have been aimed at protect-
ing the ability of individual creditors to undertake
legal actions against the sovereign in detriment of
the (collective) interests of the majority of creditors.
The threatening presence of holdouts is conceived
as a “disciplining device” that will force debtors to
improve the terms of their restructuring offer as com-
pared to what they would be in their absence. There
is an implicit hypothesis that the sovereign debtor
has (at least) a considerable degree of “unwilling-
ness to pay”. Otherwise, if this were not the case, it
may be argued that creditors should not always strive
to obtain the most “generous” terms in a debt re-
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sustainability, because that can only generate fur-
ther “workout” costs and a lower recovery of value
in the long term.
III. Lending into arrears policy:
its pro-creditor bias and
inconsistent implementation
The IMF’s policy of lending into arrears ena-
bles the Fund to provide balance of payments support
to a sovereign debtor that has fallen into arrears to
its private creditors and is one of the main elements
of the so-called “framework for crisis prevention and
resolution.25 It is probably the main “instrument”
with which the Fund can influence the outcome of
the debt restructuring process of a sovereign that is
already in default as well as its future economic per-
formance. In effect, by lending into arrears, and
through the conditionality associated to it, the Fund
contributes to determining the precise balance be-
tween financing and adjustment.
Its effectiveness resides in that it creates an in-
centive structure that may lead to negotiations
between the debtor and its creditors, where the
former, despite its financial vulnerability, is not as
hard pressed to rapidly reach an agreement at any
cost as it would be the case if arrears were not toler-
ated. Because of this, LIA policy can have a major
impact on the balance of power between the debtor
and its creditors and was, in fact, originally designed
to curb the latter’s power.
How does the IMF use its lending into arrears
policy? The Fund has an effective “carrot” to im-
pose some conditions on the debtor since, together
with the other IFIs, it is the only actor that may be
willing to lend to a sovereign in default. This gives
it the capacity to induce the sovereign debtor to adopt
the adjustment policies required to comply with
conditionality under an IMF programme. In ex-
change, the Fund continues to provide support if the
sovereign’s negotiations with its creditors stagnate
because they are demanding restructuring terms that
are not consistent with the programme. Progress with
the elimination of arrears is monitored by the IMF’s
Board through financing assurances reviews, which
are maintained as long as the country has outstand-
ing arrears to external private creditors. Creditors
are also supposed to benefit from LIA policy, to the
extent that the implementation of an IMF programme
presumably indicates that the financing that the sov-
ereign debtor is seeking from them is consistent with
the mix of adjustment and financing assumed in the
programme. On the other hand, by signalling that it
is willing to support the debtor country the Fund may
also force the creditors to accept less favourable
terms in the debt restructuring than what they other-
wise might have obtained.
In essence, the IMF is providing what, in the
corporate context, is called debtor-in-possession fi-
nancing.26 The function of this “DIP” financing in
the sovereign context is to compensate for the lack
of an international legal framework that can guaran-
tee enforceability over the sovereign debtor. As was
discussed in previous sections, there are consider-
able difficulties in creating a legal seniority whereby
private creditors accept to subordinate their claims
to the providers of new money. Thus, the IMF and
the other IFIs have no viable substitute in the sover-
eign debt context, because they are the only actors
with de facto seniority or preferred creditor status.
This is what enables them to provide DIP financing
in the first place.
From 1989, when LIA policy was first codi-
fied,27 until the early 2000s, the IMF adapted the
policy to the changing circumstances and develop-
ments in international financial markets, basically
relaxing the conditions needed to put the policy into
effect. But in recent years the IMF has reversed the
stance it had maintained since 1989 and has made
the conditions required for having access to IMF fi-
nancing under its LIA policy more stringent. Though
the practical application of the policy has been quite
inconsistent lately, and less strict than what the “codi-
fied version” would suggest, it seems that, probably
as a result of the Argentine experience, LIA policy
is increasingly seen by the IMF as a means to in-
duce debtor governments to “accommodate” to
creditors interests.
This view of what “optimal” LIA policy should
be like is rather contradictory with the prevailing
consensus that creditor moral hazard is much more
relevant than debtor moral hazard in the current “in-
ternational financial architecture”. What is then the
IMF’s motivation? As will be discussed below, a
plausible answer is that the Fund is giving in to the
pressure of the international financial community.
But regardless of political economy considerations,
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solidates, may complicate debt restructurings and
harm debtor countries’ interests.
The “new view” on the role of LIA policy cannot
be justified on reasonable public policy foundations.
Through its LIA policy and by choosing the amount
of resources that it is prepared to make available,
the IMF can have a large influence over whether
and when a sovereign seeks to restructure its private
sector debt and also over the terms that the country
will seek in the debt exchange, including the size of
the haircut. Thus, its participation, “distorting” what
would otherwise be a market outcome, can only be
justified if it induces, at least, a “paretian improve-
ment”, but not if it undermines the interests of the
debtor country by pushing it again into an unsus-
tainable debt path. This would be in clear contradic-
tion to the original motivation for implementing the
LIA policy and could render it useless or, at least,
greatly diminish its possible contribution to a con-
structive restructuring process. Why has the IMF
been reversing the historical orientation of its LIA
policy? To find an answer to this question it is use-
ful to review the evolution of this policy over time.
IV. The evolution of LIA policy
over time
The circumstances that motivated the birth of
LIA policy are worth mentioning, because they il-
lustrate the nature of the problems the lending into
arrears policy was originally intended to address, and
serve as a reminder that the effective implementa-
tion of the LIA policy, because of the way the IMF
may apply it in practice, can eventually turn its origi-
nal logic on its head.
The policy was put into effect at a relatively
recent stage in the IMF’s history and was a conse-
quence of the 1980s debt crisis. In fact, until 1989,
the IMF’s access policy prohibited the Fund from
extending new lending to a country that had fallen
into arrears on payments to other creditors. This non
lending into arrears principle, which dates back to
1970, is still, in reality, the prevailing general rule
and the LIA policy must be understood as an excep-
tion to it, rather than as a substitute.28 Originally this
general policy applied to arrears arising from the
imposition of exchange restrictions but in 1980 its
coverage was extended to payment arrears originat-
ing in sovereign defaults. Interestingly, the 1980 re-
view of the policy recognized that the objective of
elimination of arrears during the relevant programme
period – normally 12 months – was not always
achievable for members with large debt service prob-
lems (Boughton, 2001).
The traditional IMF’s rationale for not lending
into arrears on external payments was that a sover-
eign incurring in arrears was acting against two fun-
damental IMF principles and the assumption was that
such stance was against its own interests as well.
First, by not paying its external creditors, the sover-
eign was significantly reducing its chances of hav-
ing access to voluntary foreign financing, which
would have the effect of exacerbating its balance of
payment problems in the long term and putting into
doubt its medium-term sustainability. Moreover, and
from an international public policy perspective, the
incurrence of arrears was against the IMF’s objec-
tive of promoting international monetary coopera-
tion, and could have adverse effects on trade and
capital flows. Thus, Fund programmes required
the elimination of existing arrears and the non-
accumulation of new arrears to official and private
external creditors during the programme period.
Second, the non lending into arrears policy was
to a large extent a consequence of the objective of
“safeguarding the Fund’s resources”. When foreign
private creditors are trying to limit their exposure,
the Fund cannot assume that they will be willing to
contribute in the financing of Fund-supported pro-
grammes. Accordingly, the elimination of arrears was
a necessary precondition for a member’s re-access
to capital markets, which, in turn, was viewed as
necessary to enable the member to repay the Fund.
However, by the late 1980s the principle of
non-toleration of arrears was effectively blocking
progress towards a solution of the debt crisis. More-
over, creditor banks, which until then had been per-
suaded to (partially) finance debtor countries, were
increasingly reluctant to maintain that modus oper-
andi.
In effect, once the balance sheets of creditor
banks had been “cleaned”, through the full provi-
sioning of their sovereign loans, the bargaining
position of these creditors strengthened and they
adopted a tougher stance in the negotiations with
sovereign debtors. This factor, coupled with the
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“laissez faire” approach to debt restructuring had
failed to effectively moderate the debt overhang, led
to a wider divergence of positions between credi-
tors and debtor countries regarding the terms of those
debt restructurings. In brief, there had been too much
adjustment and too little debt relief, but now banks
were in no hurry to “conceal” any losses. On the
contrary, they faced a profitable “upside”, and the
larger it was the better.
Consequently, the problem was that, even when
the debtor countries were willing to undertake ad-
justment programmes so that their debts could be
serviced, creditors would demand payment terms that
typically imposed an exaggerated burden on sover-
eign debtors. In this context, the IMF’s policy of not
lending into arrears precluded the Fund from pro-
viding financial assistance to a debtor that was in
arrears to its private creditors, even when the mem-
ber country was making every effort to restructure
its debts and improve its repayment capacity.
This had the undesirable consequence of effec-
tively giving private creditors the power to exercise
a veto over IMF lending, since they knew that the
debtor country would not have access to IMF sup-
port unless it could reach an agreement with them
first. As a consequence there was a risk that the ad-
justment process in the debtor country could be
undermined and end up being more costly and dis-
orderly.
In response to concerns that this “approach”
was unnecessarily restrictive, the IMF finally intro-
duced, in 1989, a lending into arrears policy that
allowed the provision of financial assistance in the
presence of arrears. In addition to the LIA policy,
the Fund established a policy that made resources
available to help finance the up-front cost of Brady
debt and debt-service reduction operations. This
antecedent is relevant nowadays and the possibility
of including similar initiatives under the LIA policy
should be considered.
Not by chance, the birth of the new policy co-
incided with the dawn of a new era (at least
considering the period after WWII) where bond fi-
nancing and the securitization of loan portfolios was
replacing the dominance of bank financing as the
preferred means of lending to sovereign govern-
ments.29 In fact, the possibility of selling sovereign
loans in the increasingly liquid secondary markets
was one of the main factors that had helped to
strengthen the bargaining position of banks. The
migration from bank to bond financing would only
strengthen the rationale of the LIA policy, by increas-
ing coordination problems among creditors in the
process of restructuring sovereign debt.
Nevertheless, in its first 1989 version, the LIA
policy was restricted to bank debts, and allowed for
the approval of an arrangement before banks had
provided assurances of their willingness to provide
“support” in line with the assumptions of the IMF
programme (support which typically consisted of a
combination of a restructuring of arrears and princi-
pal maturing during the period and new money that
helped debtor countries meet interest payments).
Lending into arrears was to be approved when the
following conditions were met:
• prompt Fund support was considered essential
for the successful implementation of the mem-
ber’s adjustment programme;
• negotiations between the member and its com-
mercial bank creditors on a restructuring had
begun;
• it was expected that a financial package con-
sistent with external viability would be agreed
within a reasonable period.
In practice, these were neither necessary nor
sufficient conditions to justify providing financing
to a sovereign debtor in arrears, and the policy was
(and is) to be applied on a case-by-case basis. This
constitutes a sort of “escape clause” which gives the
Executive Board more flexibility.
In 1998 the LIA policy was broadened to cover
debt to non bank private creditors, which, in prac-
tice, meant largely debt in the form of international
sovereign bonds. This implied changes in the word-
ing in two of the above-mentioned conditions,
resulting in the following:
• prompt Fund support was considered essential
for the successful implementation of the mem-
ber’s adjustment programme;
• negotiations between the member and its pri-
vate creditors had begun;
• there were firm indications that the sovereign
borrower and its private creditors would nego-
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The changed wording of the last condition re-
flected concerns over the possibility that negotia-
tions with bondholders could become complex and
protracted (as opposed to the relatively “easy” ne-
gotiations with international banks30). Moreover, the
revised 1998 version brought non sovereign arrears
to private creditors arising from the imposition of
exchange controls within the scope of the lending
into arrears policy under fairly similar criteria.
In 1999 the LIA policy was modified again
(IMF, 1999), with the problems posed by bond fi-
nancing as the paramount motivation behind the
changes. There were concerns that coordination and
other difficulties provoked by the large number and
potentially disparate interests of bondholders could
lead creditors to delay negotiations following a de-
fault and to be less disposed toward a settlement, a
situation aggravated by the fact that most bondhold-
ers did not have a long-term business relationship
with the debtor country to protect, unlike many banks
in the 1980s debt crisis. As a consequence, there was
a risk that the Fund could be prevented from lend-
ing even if the sovereign debtor was undertaking
appropriate policies (“appropriate” in the view of
the IMF, of course) and the IMF’s support was es-
sential to the adjustment effort, given that the two
last criteria above would not be met. Those two cri-
teria were thus replaced by a somewhat “softened”
language while the first criterion remained un-
changed, leading to the following formulation:
• prompt Fund support is considered essential for
the successful implementation of the member’s
adjustment programme;
• the member is pursuing appropriate policies and
is making a good faith effort to reach a col-
laborative agreement with its creditors.
The main change in comparison with the 1998
formulation is the fact that the implementation of
the LIA policy no longer required that the sovereign
debtor actually engage in negotiations prior to its
requesting financial assistance from the Fund. In-
stead, it should have been making “good faith”
efforts, a clause that, in principle, may improve the
“incentive structure” depending on the way in which
it is interpreted. This was a modification of no mi-
nor importance and an improvement over the
previous requirement that the debtor had actually
begun negotiations by the time it applied for IMF
lending. However, it must be taken into account that,
whereas in the 1989 and 1998 formulations both the
debtor and its creditors were implicitly required to
“prove” that they had embarked on negotiations with
the other party, the 1999 changes imply that only
the debtor has to make a “good faith” effort.
As could be anticipated, the 1999 modification
of LIA policy was not well received in the interna-
tional financial community, where some investors
emphasized their concern that the prospect of IMF’s
assistance would encourage debtor moral hazard.31
The critics’ view was that IMF policy had gone too
far and it was necessary to give back to creditors
some of the bargaining power they had lost. The IMF
has since then tried to attenuate the presumed bias
of its lending into arrears policy in favour of debt-
ors’ interests, taking heed of private sector demands
that the “playing field” be rebalanced.
In effect, the 1999 modification was the last
“softening” in the conditions required for lending
into arrears. These would be “tightened” in Septem-
ber 2002, when the latest formal changes to LIA
policy were codified. On that occasion the Fund es-
tablished a set of general principles and procedures
to guide creditor-debtor dialogue (IMF, 2002a), in
an attempt to clarify the meaning of the “good faith”
criterion.
Indeed, because of its nature, the “good faith”
criterion is inherently subjective and somewhat
vague, so it soon became evident that, to make it
operational, it would need some “refining”. This was
consistent with the Fund’s policy of recent years,
which has proclaimed its preference for the enforce-
ment of rules along the “rules versus discretion con-
tinuum”, a preference that has been based on concerns
about moral hazard. However, actual policy imple-
mentation has often turned out to be less constrained
than what the formal procedures would suggest. This
is not bad in and of itself, on the contrary, it is prob-
ably realistic and better than mechanically follow-
ing rules, but it is certainly at odds with what the
IMF claims to be doing and. Still worse, the IMF
can use the degree of discretion it has in a way that
may harm debtor countries’ interests, as happened
in the case of Argentina, instead of contributing to
their economic recovery.
The stated aim of the principles for creditor-
debtor dialogue is to deal with the inter-creditor
equity problem (as a complement to the SDRM32 and
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level, to contribute to the efficient operation of capital
markets. Because the “good faith criterion” has be-
come so central to the LIA policy, it is worth examining
them in detail. They are the following:
• When a member has reached a judgment that a
restructuring of its debt is necessary, it should
engage in an early dialogue with its creditors,
which should continue until the restructuring
is complete;
• The member should share relevant, non confi-
dential information with all creditors on a
timely basis, which would normally include:
- an explanation of the economic problems and
financial circumstances that justify a debt
restructuring;
- a briefing on the broad outlines of a viable
economic programme to address the under-
lying problems and its implications on the
broad financial parameters shaping the en-
velope of resources available for restructured
claims;
- the provision of a comprehensive picture of
the proposed treatment of all claims on the
sovereign, including those of official bilat-
eral creditors, and the elaboration of the basis
on which the debt restructuring would re-
store medium-term sustainability, bearing in
mind that not all categories of claims may
need to be restructured.
• The member should provide creditors with an
early opportunity to give input on the design
of restructuring strategies and the design of in-
dividual instruments.
The Fund made it clear that it was up to the
sovereign debtor to choose the specific modality for
conducting the dialogue with its creditors so that it
could be “tailored to the specific features of indi-
vidual cases”. This seems to provide with enough
flexibility to accommodate particular circumstances.
However, it still places the burden on the debtor to
prove that it was making every effort to maintain
adequate consultations with its creditors. Because
of its implications, how the debtor engages its credi-
tors is a crucial issue, on which the impact of the
whole LIA policy in its practical application can rest.
The key issue here is the degree of “formality”
that is required of the engagement with the creditors
to qualify as satisfactory for compliance with the
“good faith” criterion. Is it advisable to require the
debtor to engage creditors within a very formal ne-
gotiating framework or it would suffice with a less
structured kind of dialogue? IMF staff discussed
three possible approaches for “refining” the LIA
policy as regards this criterion and giving it proce-
dural clarity (IMF, 2002a). Under the first approach,
or status quo approach, the policy would have re-
mained unchanged and sovereign debtors would
have maintained considerable discretion regarding
the mechanics of engagement with its creditors. This
approach was rejected because, in the view of the
Fund, it implied giving too much leeway to debtors.
The stated reasons for rejecting it were its inconsist-
ency with the promotion of transparency and its
ambiguity, which would create uncertainty about
the restructuring process that could have negative
spillover effects on the access of other countries to
international capital markets.
Under the second approach, the debtor would
have been required to negotiate with its creditors
within an organized framework. This option was
rejected because it was obviously too impractical,
since it lacked the minimum degree of flexibility
necessary to adapt to the varying circumstances of
sovereign debt restructurings and because it did not
take into account the fact that constituting a representa-
tive committee in a short period may prove unfeasible.
The third approach, which in theory is currently
being implemented, is a sort of compromise between
the first and second approaches, under which the
debtor “would be expected to engage in an early and
continuous dialogue with its creditors” in accord-
ance with the above-mentioned principles for credi-
tor-debtor dialogue. Importantly, under this approach
the debtor is “expected” to enter into negotiations
with a “sufficiently representative” committee when
this exists.
For this approach to be operational, the Fund
is supposed to consider a set of factors that influ-
ence the extent to which a more or less formal kind
of engagement between debtor and creditors can be
judged to be adequate. The first of these factors is
the complexity of the restructuring, which depends
on the number and heterogeneity of creditors, the
variety of debt instruments and claims, with its con-
sequent impact on inter-creditor equity issues, and
the likely size of the haircut required to reestablish
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The second factor for judging whether a for-
mal negotiating framework is necessary or not is the
representativeness of the creditor committee. The
Fund claims that this can be inferred from the pro-
portion of principal held by creditors that have
signalled their support for the committee and by the
extent to which the main types of creditors are rep-
resented in it, though it falls short of recommending
the establishment of a numerical threshold.
The third factor considered is whether a “rea-
sonable period has elapsed to allow for the forma-
tion of a representative committee”, where the
judgment has to take into account the characteris-
tics of the investor base (if it is spread over many
countries or not) and the debtor’s behaviour either
facilitating or trying to block the formation of the
committee. However, once a committee that is
deemed to be “representative” by the IMF has been
established, even if it is not representative at all in
the view of the debtor, the sovereign is required to
make good faith efforts to negotiate with it.
Moreover, the debtor is expected to negotiate
the terms of the restructuring with the committee on
the basis of the following set of principles of “best
practice”, which were drafted by the private sector:33
• A collective framework could be established
for the sovereign debtor to negotiate a restruc-
turing of its debt with a steering committee
representative of all private creditors. In complex
restructurings, there may be a number of subcom-
mittees that channel into the steering committee;
• The debtor would share information with the
steering committee, including – where neces-
sary – confidential information, to enable credi-
tors to make informed decisions regarding the
terms of a restructuring. Committee members
would need to commit to take appropriate steps
to preserve confidentiality;
• Creditors represented on the committee would
agree to a standstill on litigation during the ne-
gotiating process;
• The steering committee would retain financial
and legal advisors and the reasonable costs of
these advisors would be borne by the debtor.
To expedite complex restructurings, the com-
mittee and the debtor may choose to appoint a
mediator to facilitate the negotiating process;
• The steering committee would not be able to
take decisions that would be binding on credi-
tors. At the same time, the debtor would not be
required to secure unanimous support of the
committee for restructuring proposals.
The only counterbalance to this clearly pro-
creditor bias is that, when negotiations stagnate
because the demands of creditors are inconsistent
with the parameters that may have previously been
established in a Fund-supported programme, the
Fund can continue to support the country despite the
lack of progress in negotiations.
In effect, in theory the LIA policy is designed
to operate against the background of a Fund arrange-
ment that provides for an appropriate34 balance
between financing and adjustment, a balance that
should aim at both preventing the debtor country
from suffering extreme economic hardship and en-
couraging it to undertake measures to recover external
viability. At the same time, this contributes to sup-
porting the value of creditor assets or, at least, to
preventing an excessive loss of value.
This implies that the Fund can have a signifi-
cant influence on the expectations that both creditors
and the debtor will have about the possible terms of
the restructuring, because it is clear that the men-
tioned parameters define the limits or possible range
of the restructuring terms. This, in turn, underlines
the centrality of the IMF’s debt sustainability assess-
ments (DSA) for the application of LIA policy, given
that it is the technical element on the basis of which
the multilateral institution can judge whether credi-
tors’ demands are consistent or not with the
parameters of the Fund programme.
The criteria and principles that have just been
reviewed reflect the IMF’s attempts to be seen as an
impartial arbiter in debt restructurings, after all the
criticisms the institution had received from repre-
sentatives of the (private) international financial
community. However, the IMF is still not an impar-
tial arbiter, but has rather drifted in favour of creditor
interests. It would have been more commendable,
and would have fit more comfortably with the role
the IMF should play as a multilateral institution, if a
more balanced set of principles had been proposed.
Certainly, there is an obvious asymmetry be-
tween the incentives that the sovereign debtor and
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the possibility of receiving Fund financing repre-
sents a strong incentive for the debtor, so that it may
feel compelled to comply with the guidelines, there
is no similar incentive for the creditor to agree (or to
maintain) a standstill on litigation during the nego-
tiating process. This imbalance is not unintended,
but is the result of a deliberate attempt to strengthen
the creditors’ position in sovereign debt restructur-
ings. Moreover, the implications are currently more
profound than when the principles were proposed
(2002), since when the SDRM project was still a
possibility, the issue of the standstill had some chance
of being stipulated in a more balanced form.
However, as has been stressed before, all this
does not necessarily mean that the actual implemen-
tation of LIA policy will be tough on the debtors in
each and every case, but it does imply that the IMF
will have more formal excuses for adopting a less
supportive position in some instances, as has been
the case in Argentina since 2002.
Certainly, despite paying lip service to the pre-
sumed freedom that debtors would have in managing
creditor-debtor relations, the principles are not far
from prescribing definitive rules as to how the debt
negotiations should be conducted. This is very clearly
evidenced in the requirement that once creditors have
organized a representative committee on a timely
basis the sovereign must conduct negotiations with
that committee. The risk is that this may be giving back
to creditors precisely the lost leverage that LIA policy
was created to take away from them in the first place.
It also entails limiting the flexibility that was being
sought when LIA policy was established as an ex-
ception to the general rule of not lending into arrears.
In any event, the Fund should avoid the temp-
tation to “micromanage” the debt restructuring
process. This would clearly be a mistake, given the
complexity and diversity of the circumstances which
may characterize that process, as determined by the
types of bonds held by creditors, the investor base,
the scale of the restructuring, whether the debtor
country is or not in default, etc. In some aspects, the
principles establish details that are almost ridiculous
for the IMF to endorse. For example, the fees of le-
gal and financial advisors should be borne entirely
by the debtor country. Is it a matter of principle that
there cannot be any burden sharing of these costs?
The principles are also based on assumptions
that may not be justifiable. Again, the preference
for negotiations undertaken with creditor commit-
tees is a case in point. Even though an “organized
framework”35 may be advantageous for the sover-
eign debtor in some circumstances this is not always
so. After all, it is sensible to assume that no party
other than the sovereign debtor is in a better posi-
tion to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of this
framework vis-à-vis a more informal mechanism.
In fact, there may be situations where because of
“strategic” considerations the debtor may consider
that the risks and costs of negotiating with a formal
creditor committee clearly outweigh the benefits.
This may happen if, for example, the sovereign is
concerned about the possibility that a collective
framework might provide a platform for dissident
creditors to rally support, a development that may
end up further complicating the restructuring proc-
ess instead of accelerating it. If creditor heterogene-
ity is prevalent in the most complex cases of
sovereign default, then this concern cannot be lightly
dismissed. Besides, it is a fact that trading in sec-
ondary markets can rapidly change the identity of
“final” creditors, making the effective functioning
of a creditor committee more complicated by alter-
ing the relative weights of the different creditor “in-
terest groups”.36 Even if, in principle, a more formal
collective negotiating framework becomes more de-
sirable the more complex the restructuring is bound
to be, this very complexity makes it highly unlikely
that a committee can be established on a timely ba-
sis. Another drawback is the time-consuming nature
and resource intensiveness of an organized frame-
work for negotiations between the debtor and its
creditors.
This preference for a creditor committee can
also backfire from the perspective of the Fund it-
self. If the sovereign debtor engages in a very
“structured” dialogue with creditors prior to the ap-
proval of a Fund supported programme, creditors
will probably seek to influence the parameters that
define the envelope of resources. At the same time,
the Fund would be “negotiating” the same param-
eters with the debtor. Consequently, there would be
two negotiating tables operating simultaneously,
which would inevitably be interrelated, with each
side trying to exploit the linkages between them to
its advantage. The Fund is supposed to “strike a bal-
ance” and determine the exact amount of burden
sharing that each side will bear. But there is a risk
that it could fall captive to one of the parties and
that it might thus lose legitimacy. A more informal
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would not eliminate altogether) this risk. Besides,
in the context just mentioned, it would be crucial
for the debtor to preserve confidentiality. It is doubt-
ful that there is a strong case for sharing confidential
information with a representative committee on a
regular basis. This should be left to the debtor’s dis-
cretion and not be a part of a “best practices guide”.
Given the high stakes involved in a sovereign debt
restructuring, it is unlikely that the debtor will be
willing to test the strength of “Chinese walls” or the
honesty of supposedly impartial advisors.
There is a more fundamental criticism of the
attempt to establish these “LIA-compatible” guide-
lines for negotiations between the sovereign debtor
and its creditors. Are these procedural issues the most
important factors that may retard an agreement or
even make it impossible? This is unlikely to be the
case. Creditors seem to be (and actually should be)
more concerned with substantial issues, such as the
definition of debt-service envelopes, problems of
inter-creditor equity, questions related to the design
of the new debt instruments to be offered in exchange
for the defaulted ones, etc.
But despite the effort devoted by the IMF to
clarifying the meaning of the “good faith” criterion
and the “recommended” modalities of engagement
of the debtor with its creditors, what matters in the
end is how the LIA policy is actually applied and
the extent to which it contributes to achieving a fair
debt restructuring.
V. LIA policy in practice
There is a currently a consensus regarding LIA
policy: it has been inconsistently applied across
countries and it has failed in terms of its objectives.
The IMF itself considers its LIA policy to be the
main element in need of improvement in its “frame-
work” for crisis resolution in emerging markets (IMF,
2005a). But it is seeking to improve it though changes
in the formal criteria regulating the application of
the policy. This may not have a significant impact
on the way the policy is implemented if enough flex-
ibility has to be preserved.
Indeed, the effective implementation of LIA
policy has been criticized on several grounds. It has
been argued that LIA policy lacks predictability (an
usual criticism regarding IMF lending in general37),
and that there are still significant uncertainties for
all actors involved regarding the precise role that
the IMF may play in post-default restructuring ne-
gotiations. In particular, there is an ongoing debate
about how to give a more operational content to the
“good faith” criterion. There are also more basic
questions that have been posed with regard to this
criterion: is it just possible to establish clear guide-
lines for something that is inherently quite vague?
Is the criterion useful, either in its current formula-
tion or with any other alternative language? Is further
“clarification” the way to improve LIA policy?
Probably not. Because of the nature of the prob-
lem it is designed to address, LIA policy will always
be necessarily ambiguous and cannot be suitably
“parameterized”. Even more, greater precision could
be counterproductive, and the IMF’s Executive
Board seems to be well aware of this. That might be
the reason why the efforts to achieve more “clarity”
have not made progress. The IMF does not want to
tie its own hands. That may be a good thing.
After all, a certain degree of discretion or even
“arbitrariness” might be sometimes called for if it is
for the sake of improving outcomes from what they
otherwise would have been under a very neatly speci-
fied formal framework which does not leave any
“margin for manoeuvre”. This is just another mani-
festation of the time-inconsistency problem. Of
course, it implies that the incentive structure faced
by debtors and creditors will be suboptimal, but it is
very hard to envisage an “optimal” LIA policy that
adequately balances ex ante and ex post efficiency
considerations and gets rid of moral hazard com-
pletely. It is simply not possible to foresee all the
contingencies that may have to be dealt with in a
complex post-default context when a country needs
to restructure its debt.
Leaving the question of the specific wording
of the criteria aside, it is important to evaluate if the
Fund’s recent interventions by means of its LIA
policy have contributed to moderating the costs of
crises for debtor countries and have played a con-
structive role in debt negotiations. In short, have they
been welfare improving? Have they really struck
a balance between the objective of improving the
functioning of capital markets and the objective of
providing timely and (let’s add) “adequate” assist-
ance to countries undergoing an extreme economic
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Focusing on middle-income countries, the set
of nations where LIA policy has been applied in re-
cent years is relatively small, because there were
exchange offers of sovereign debt which took place
before there were any formal arrears to private credi-
tors (these were the cases of Ukraine and Uruguay)
and the remaining holdouts did not represent a sig-
nificant amount of the original debt and were paid
in full. LIA policy has been applied in the cases of
Argentina, Ecuador and the Russian Federation.39 In
the case of Ecuador, after restructuring its debt with
the participation of 98 per cent of bondholders, the
remaining arrears had been cleared by December
2000, so LIA policy ceased to apply after that date.
In the case of the Russian Federation, lending under
the stand-by arrangement approved in July 1999
applied LIA policy, given the existence of arrears to
private bondholders.
But it is surely the Argentine experience after
its default, that provides the best case study of the
difficulties involved in the application of LIA policy.
Paradoxically, it was precisely the Argentine crisis
and its paradigmatic status as the greatest sovereign
default in history what had given impetus to the IMF
to refine such policy. Thus, the revised LIA policy
(2002) failed its first test.
The most contentious issue has been (and still
is) the interpretation of the “good faith” criterion. In
particular, with regard to the expectation that, when
a “representative” committee has been established
on a “timely” basis the country should go beyond
constructive dialogue and enter into good faith ne-
gotiations with it. The application of this criterion is
supposed to be based on the “unique characteristics”
of each case40 and the crucial aspects are the com-
plexity of the situation – which may warrant a less
structured mechanism for dialogue –, the representa-
tiveness of the committee and the timeliness of its
constitution.
In the case of Argentina, a committee called
GCAB (Global Committee of Argentina Bondhold-
ers) was established on a timely basis but Argentine
authorities disputed its representativeness and argued
that, because of the complexity of the envisaged debt
exchange a structured framework for negotiations
would be counterproductive. In particular, they argued
that the GCAB did not have the power to bind in credi-
tors and there was not enough evidence of support
from the bondholders it claimed to represent. More-
over, Argentine authorities remarked that important
constituencies of bondholders (principally those lo-
cated in Argentina) were not represented in GCAB.
The IMF maintained that creditor committees
have an advisory role and are not supposed to be
able to take decisions that would be binding and in-
sisted on the representativeness of the GCAB.
Related to this issue were also questions about con-
flicts of interest41 of some of the entities forming
GCAB. The head of GCAB, Nicholas Stock, threat-
ened to use the IMF as an instrument to put pressure
on Argentina to negotiate with GCAB. In fact, this
pressure was not even necessary, since both the
United States Treasury and the G-7 were also re-
quiring the IMF to push for a “negotiated” solution
(Helleiner, 2005). Argentina did not bow to the pres-
sure and the issue was a source of continuous
frictions between the debtor and the IMF.
The whole issue of negotiations is probably
beside the point and is a rather “ancillary” element
that should not distract from the fundamental prob-
lems. Indeed, the importance of establishing “formal”
negotiations with a “representative” creditor com-
mittee must be questioned, since it may imply putting
too much emphasis on the debtor’s “good manners”
(and not on the creditors’!!), which have nothing to
do with the issues of substance. After all Argentina
did what has become the standard in sovereign debt
restructurings: a take-it-or-leave-it unilateral ex-
change offer. It clearly did not innovate on this, given
that negotiations in the IMF solemn meaning of the
word did not take place in any of the previous debt
restructurings, largely because there was no need for
them. Moreover, the “technique” of unilateral ex-
change offers does not imply that there are no
consultations with creditors or that creditors do not
have the opportunity to provide any inputs to the
restructuring proposal. It simply implies that this task
is undertaken by the investment banks hired to de-
sign the details of the debt exchange, which do the
market soundings to, precisely, check its degree of
acceptability among the creditors.
A clarifying perspective to consider this issue
is by imagining what negotiations would mean in
the world of corporate debt restructurings if there
was no bankruptcy law and no possibility of easily
attaching assets. In that context, negotiations could
not even take place “in the shadow of the law”, as
often happens in practice. They would probably re-
semble the offers we see in sovereign restructurings.
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tional dimension that cannot be overlooked, because
it is an essential part of the problem: governments
will never accept to seriously discuss their economic
programmes with private creditors and will not want
to be “seen” by their constituents as doing so. Their
political survival would be at stake. This is perhaps
less stark in a pre-default context, where the popu-
lation might be willing to support draconian meas-
ures. However, there have been no negotiations in
the IMF meaning of the word in pre-default situa-
tions either.
Another difficulty with LIA policy raised by
the Argentine case is, precisely, that it does not es-
tablish any difference between the pre- and post-
restructuring scenarios. The policy is applied under
the same conditions as long as there are arrears with
external creditors. However, this poses a problem.
If the “haircut” required to restore debt sustainability
is very high, as it was in the Argentine case, the par-
ticipation rate of bondholders may be relatively low,
at least as compared to other exchange offers where
debt sustainability is more easily achievable. As a
consequence, arrears on private external debt will
remain high, but not as a result of a lack of will to
seek a collaborative dialogue by the debtor but be-
cause the “reservation price” of the (marginal) credi-
tors is inconsistent with sustainability. Paying
holdout creditors in full, as has often been done in
other debt exchanges, would not be feasible when
the amounts involved have macroeconomic signifi-
cance, but this implies that arrears may persist for a
long time. Thus, LIA policy would seem to require
more flexibility when applied in a post-restructur-
ing context, though this does not imply that there
should necessarily be specific “written” conditions
for such cases.
The Argentine case had another complicating
facet. Given that Argentina represented a dramatic
example of a failed bail out, IMF’s exposure before
the default was already at high levels, so financial
assistance to Argentina had to be framed within the
Exceptional Access Framework42 and the “formal”
barriers to further financing were consequently con-
siderable, if for no other reason than the wish to show
that the EAF was effectively enforced.
Thus, Argentina, despite the depth of the crisis
after the devaluation and default, was the only ma-
jor Fund debtor that did not receive any financing in
net terms as from late 2001. Is this justified? It can
be argued that it is not.
The situation was so catastrophic that it is sen-
sible to demand that the IMF, being a multilateral
institution whose role is, in theory, to help its mem-
bers moderate the costs of balance of payments crisis,
should have intervened by providing some net fi-
nancing. At the very least, it should have accepted to
maintain, if not to increase, its exposure until the worst
phase of the crisis had passed. Instead, the IMF sought
to systematically reduce its exposure as rapidly as it
could.43 What was the rationale for this behaviour?
It was obviously, in part, the concern that main-
taining its exposure to Argentina, not to speak of
increasing it, would have been in contradiction with
the proper safeguarding of Fund resources required
by LIA policy. In the IMF’s view Argentina entailed
risks that were too high. This view, although it has
turned out to be wrong,44 was not at all absurd ini-
tially,45 even if the risks were overestimated.46 The
problem is not the fact that the Fund sought to safe-
guard its resources, which is understandable, but
rather that it has not been consistent across coun-
tries in its efforts to do so. Moreover, it seems clear
that there was an intention of “punishing” Argentina,
probably as a means of generating a demonstration
effect on other potential defaulters.
If Argentina was an unacceptable risk, so was
Uruguay in 2003, when the Fund endorsed a debt
restructuring that was probably too “investor
friendly”, implying the need for the IMF to main-
tain or even increase exposure during a long period.47
Besides, even if the Fund had provided net lending
to Argentina in 2002, the country’s exposure would
have still been below several other cases of excep-
tional access.48 (in per cent of quota). It is also
legitimate to ask whether LIA policy should be dif-
ferent in the cases of “catastrophes” as opposed to
“grave but not extreme” economic crises. If there is
a need for a LIA policy tailored for low-income coun-
tries, there might be a need for a LIA policy tailored
to middle-income countries under extreme circum-
stances. The latter, in contrast to the former, have
access to the international capital markets, which
adds and additional layer of complexity, unlike in
the case of low-income countries, where most debt
is owed to the IFIs themselves. In the end, questions
such as this reinforce the perception that LIA policy
cannot and should not be “parameterized” beyond
some easily agreed-on principles. It is by essence
highly judgmental. Not least because those that have
to implement it are human beings, after all, and this
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For example, in the case of Argentina, in mid-
November 2002 the government decided that it
would not make payments due to the IMF and the
World Bank. The reason was that Argentina only had
around 300 million dollars in reserves over and above
the maturing amounts owed to the IFIs, and would
be in a very vulnerable situation when, in May 2003,
the presidential elections were going to be held.
Consequently, the Argentine Government requested
for an extension of the repurchase schedule, but the
IMF (Koehler) was not willing to accept such a re-
quest (even though it was only a rollover, strictly
speaking). In the end, it was pressured to do so by
the United States Treasury and the G-7, and an IMF
“transitional” programme was approved in January
2003,50 that took into account the upcoming presi-
dential elections. Would the IMF have lent to
Argentina if it had been a technocratic institution
with full independence and isolated from political
pressures? Probably not, and this fact is very much
related to the uselessness of trying to establish in
too precise terms the conditions of access to IMF
financing. It is simply contradictory with the inevi-
table political character of the Fund as an institution.
The conflictive relationship between Argentina
and the Fund has continued to this day, and the im-
plementation of LIA policy has been increasingly at
the centre of the disputes in one way or the other,
relegating other issues to the sidelines. The IMF used
the LIA criteria to do the opposite of what LIA policy
was originally intended to do: it was used as a way
of extorting the debtor to offer more money to its
creditors.
In September 2003 a three-year programme was
launched and IMF pressures based on its interpreta-
tion of the good faith criterion intensified. At the
same time, however, the Fund did something differ-
ent than what had been its usual procedure in the
previous episodes in which LIA policy had been
applied: the fiscal targets of the programme beyond
2004 were specifically left undefined above a 3 per
cent floor (for the primary surplus), with the aim of
giving Argentina and its creditors the room to nego-
tiate over the terms of the restructuring.51 This was
the United States Treasury’s laissez faire approach
to the Argentine debt restructuring in action. The
country and its creditors had to agree on a debt re-
structuring with not input from the IMF, which
abandoned its role as a natural mediator but kept
insisting on compliance with the formal, and debat-
able, requirements of LIA policy, instead of taking
advantage of its (potential) capacity to play a con-
structive role.
This paper has argued that the implementation
of LIA policy was biased in favour of creditors’ in-
terests in the Argentine case. But, of course, the Fund
did not go as far as to relinquish its de facto pre-
ferred creditor status52 and it was not willing to put
issues of principle before its interest in sharply re-
ducing exposure. Thus, when Argentina, facing a real
possibility that the Fund would not authorize an ef-
fective “rollover” of its debts coming due,53 “threat-
ened” not to pay in March 2004,54 at a time when
the second review of the IMF programme was
underway, the IMF eventually gave in and the re-
view was approved.
However, executive directors representing
more than a third of votes abstained (which actually
means they opposed the approval), a situation with
virtually no precedents in IMF history. Moreover,
the G-7 decided to put pressure on Argentina to im-
prove its offer to creditors and the IMF was instructed
to operate in the same way through its LIA policy.
Finally, when the third review was underway, Ar-
gentina decided to stop it on its tracks. The country
would keep paying its debts to the IMF as they came
due but was not willing to accept the stringent
conditionality that was put forward as a precondi-
tion for approving the review. There was one
overriding issue among those conditions. Indeed, it
was probably the only issue on which the approval
depended on, the others being mere formalities: Ar-
gentina had to improve its offer to creditors. So the
end of this story was that the country “bought” the
IMF’s “silence”, and could then deal with its credi-
tors alone, without IMF’s interference on their behalf.
Was this the result of a deliberate, if convoluted, at-
tempt to bail in creditors forcefully by the IMF? It is
unlikely, but this story poses some questions of
general interest about the role of the IMF in debt
restructurings.
What other (general) considerations might have
influenced the decision not to help Argentina finan-
cially?55 One often mentioned concern is that a LIA
policy that is too liberal might encourage moral haz-
ard on the part of both debtors and creditors. How
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VI. LIA policy and moral hazard
From a theoretical perspective, moral hazard
is an inevitable consequence of any form of “insur-
ance” that weakens the agents’ perception of risk
and the disciplining power of capital markets. So, to
the extent that, by providing financing to a country
in arrears both the debtor and the creditor are better
off as compared to a situation without any assist-
ance, there is a potential for moral hazard, in which
both sides count on being “rescued” by the IMF. But
its relevance may be questioned in practice and the
case of debtor vis-à-vis creditor moral hazard should
be distinguished.
First of all, a priori, the case for the existence
of moral hazard in LIA policy is weaker than in pre-
default situations, where every effort is made to avoid
default, and the amount of resources committed in
bailouts is much larger than in any conceivable ap-
plication of LIA policy. Second, in the same way
that debtor moral hazard has been found to be weak
or non-existent in pre-default situations (see Kamin,
2002; Lane and Phillips, 2000; and Zhang, 1999),
given that incumbent governments are held respon-
sible for the crisis by their constituents and do not
reap any “profits” from their presumed misdeeds,
debtor moral hazard cannot be a relevant concern in
the implementation of LIA policy.
Of course, it may be argued that if the financ-
ing provided is too generous the country will have
less incentives to pursue appropriate, but unpopu-
lar, policies. Moreover, the financing provided by
the IMF will reduce the pressure on the sovereign’s
foreign exchange reserves and fiscal situation, with
the possible effect of diminishing the debtor govern-
ment’s incentives to reach a restructuring agreement
rapidly. This is a clearly a moral hazard side-effect,
but its relevance should not be overestimated. A
moderate amount of net financing cannot change the
incentives faced by a country with a pronounced
balance of payments deficit56 and an enormous debt
that is already in default.
After all, and as has been explained before, the
reason for allowing the IMF to lend into arrears in
the first place was because the Fund would often be
held hostage by private creditors striving for better
restructuring terms. To be a cause of debtor moral
hazard, LIA should be on a scale that it is not intended
to have and should have a very weak conditionality,
which is not the case.57
Could the IMF have feared that if it had pro-
vided financing in net terms to Argentina it would
have created a precedent which could have induced
debtor moral hazard in other countries? Not really,
only a “giveaway” would have generated that result
and we would be entering the realm of fantasy. How-
ever, creditor moral hazard is much more likely to
be stimulated if LIA policy is too lax, or even more
so if a debt restructuring to avert default (which is
outside the scope of LIA policy) implies a massive
rescue of creditors. This last kind of moral hazard is
probably the only one that may be relevant in prac-
tice, even though the evidence is also scant.
VII. The Fund’s role in debt
restructurings in two recent cases
In this regard, the Fund’s policy in Argentina
and Uruguay could not have been more contrasting.
In drawing lessons from the Argentine case, given
that at the “climatic point of the battle” the Fund
abandoned creditors to suffer their fate, the outcome
will, if anything, strongly discourage the notion of
creditor moral hazard in a post-default context. From
the IMF’s perspective, this may have been the only
positive “fruit” of the Fund’s laissez faire policy
“experiment” in Argentina. There was a considerable
degree of private sector “involvement”. But overall,
the IMF’s “strategy” was a total failure, in which it
pursued its own self-interest instead of contributing
to making both debtor and creditors better off.
In the case of Uruguay, in contrast, the IMF
did not apply a hands-off policy but embarked on a
large-scale bailout;58 it was actively involved but the
private creditors were not, at least not to the extent
that the situation required. The restructuring terms
implied only a very modest haircut in net present
value,59 and almost no reduction in the face value of
the debt. Debt “relief” consisted largely in a re-pro-
filing of the debt’s maturities.60 The IMF intervention
improved the situation of creditors but only provided
short-term relief to the debtor, because it did not
clearly solve Uruguay’s debt sustainability problem
in the long term. The debt burden may have remained
too high.61
Besides, holdout creditors are being paid in full.
Does this not generate “perverse” incentives, by
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future debt restructurings? However, whereas the
Argentine debt restructuring was not considered en-
tirely satisfactory by the IMF,62 despite some formal
compliments, Uruguay’s debt exchange was hailed
as a model of the “market-friendly” approach to cri-
sis resolution and as an example of the inclusion of
innovative “aggregation” clauses in bond contracts.
There is something odd here, probably due to
the confusing terminology being used. It may be ar-
gued that, while Uruguay’s exchange offer was
indeed “friendly” with investors it was not an ex-
ample of a market outcome. It was not based on what
the market can deliver when operating without pub-
lic intervention. Conversely, Argentina’s exchange
offer was harsh but it was much closer to have been
a “pure” market outcome. This is the result of a fun-
damental problem: given the lack of an international
bankruptcy court,63 market friendly debt restructur-
ings require a high degree of intervention or even,
in some cases, coercion. They will never be a “natu-
ral” result of the interaction of debtor and creditors.64
This puts the IMF in an impossible position.
On the one hand, it is supposed to strictly control
the use of its resources, avoid large rescue packages
and focus on PSI. On the other hand, it promotes
marked-friendly debt restructurings which are im-
possible to achieve without it becoming (very)
involved, even more so because they imply very lit-
tle PSI, so the sovereign’s debt sustainability is far
from being assured, implying that IMF resources
have to be committed for a very long period. This
square is impossible to circle.
Of course, the cases of Argentina and Uruguay
have a fundamental difference in the initial condi-
tions: Argentina had defaulted whereas Uruguay was
trying to avoid default. Debt restructurings cannot
be too coercive before default and they should not
be too market friendly after a default. What could
be a constructive role for the IMF in these two dif-
ferent contexts?
In both cases, the IMF’s overriding concern
should be to make sure that the haircut is high enough
so that the probability of the debt following an un-
sustainable path becomes almost negligible if the
sovereign debtor adopts and maintains adequate poli-
cies. Consequently, undertaking an in-depth and
broad debt sustainability assessment (DSA) is cru-
cial for determining the necessary degree of PSI. The
IMF has been making efforts in recent years to im-
prove its DSA technology (see IMF, 2002b, 2003c;
and Hostland and Karam, 2006). However, it is still
not robust enough (see Ferrucci and Penalver, 2003;
Garcia and Rigobon, 2004; Mendoza and Oviedo,
2004; and Gapen et al., 2004). At present, it does
not even take into account the fact that emerging
market economies are often hit by a set of simulta-
neous (correlated) negative shocks,65 and the per-
sistence of these shocks is also not adequately
reflected in the IMF’s DSAs.
Of course, building a truly robust DSA meth-
odology is no easy task. Perhaps, it will never be
possible, because of the complexity of the issue and
the multiple factors that may affect the sustainability
of a country’s debt.66 Thus, there will always be an
element of judgment, and the error levels in the pro-
jections of future debt dynamics may be considerable.
But if this is so, the Fund should choose to err
on the side of caution. This means that the results of
its DSAs, which determine the so-called “envelope”
of resources available for servicing the sovereigns’
debt, should only be taken as an indication of the
debtor country’s maximum (as opposed to average)
repayment capacity.67 In addition, in cases where
the sovereign is in default, the Fund could contrib-
ute, by means of its LIA policy, to reducing the
gap between the debtor’s offer and the creditors’
“reservation price”, by providing financing for
“sweeteners” or guarantees in the style of the Brady
Plan. The amount of resources involved need not be
great because the situation would be characterized
by very low prices of the sovereign’s debt. It is pre-
cisely in this contexts when the IMF should not
passively observe what the “market’s outcome” will
be. The Fund should also encourage the use of
“equity-like” instruments, like GDP warrants, which
reduce the debtor’s financial vulnerability at the same
time that it may provide creditors with significant
returns if the country’s economic performance is
good enough.68
In pre-default situations, and to be consistent
with its stated preference for market solutions (and
to show its confidence in the robustness of its DSAs)
it should not accept debt restructurings that do not
assure sustainability within a reasonable, but low
enough, margin of error. This would make it possi-
ble to achieve an acceptable degree of PSI, limit
moral hazard and, at the same time, safeguard IMF’s
resources. Otherwise, the Fund’s rhetoric will be far
from its real actions.22 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 40
Conclusions
The IMF is currently at a crucial juncture in its
history. Its relevance and usefulness are being ques-
tioned from different perspectives and the institution
is in search of an appropriate role in a world that is
very different from what it was when the IMF was
created. The IMF’s intervention as a key actor in the
cases of middle-income countries facing external
debt (financing) crises was not originally envisaged
as one of its tasks but, in practice, it has become one
of its main activities. One aspect of this intervention
is the position adopted by the Fund when there is a
need to restructure a sovereign’s debt. Recent expe-
rience suggests that the institution rarely plays a
constructive role that balances the interests of the
sovereign debtors with those of the creditors. It is
unlikely that the IMF will ever be able to contribute
to improving the outcomes of debt restructurings
undertaken under its “supervision” if it does not ac-
knowledge the existence of an unavoidable tension
between its preference for investor-friendly arrange-
ments and long-term debt sustainability.
In effect, the IMF’s rhetoric emphasizes its pref-
erence for market-based solutions to the problems
of the “international financial architecture” and the
efforts in recent years to improve the so-called
“framework for crisis prevention and resolution”
point in that direction. In this context the SDRM,
which was to be one of the pillars of that frame-
work, was doomed to failure from the start, since
the United States Government wanted the framework
to drift in the opposite direction, towards a more
hands-off approach with less involvement by the
IMF. This view reflects an overriding concern with
the problem of moral hazard, which seems exagger-
ated in the light of the weak empirical evidence about
its significance. However, the changes in LIA policy
and the more stringent criteria for exceptional ac-
cess show that this concern has had an impact on the
way policies are being shaped.
As a consequence, the IMF has made its poli-
cies formally “tougher” but it has put itself in an
uncomfortable position, because adherence to strict
rules is inconsistent with the inherent political char-
acter of the Fund and often becomes impossible in
practice, in addition to being significantly inefficient,
from an ex post perspective. Inevitably, there has
been a significant gap between the formal criteria
regulating IMF “interventions” and actual practice.
However, these more stringent formal criteria are
not totally harmless because they can provide the
“excuse” for adopting a hands-off stance or even
favouring the creditors, which is not the proper role
for the IMF.
The institution should instead focus on making
a positive contribution to the reduction in the costs
of crises for both debtor countries and their credi-
tors, by trying to support a “Pareto improving”
arrangement that leaves both sides better off. The
Fund can have a significant influence on the out-
come of sovereign debt restructurings, mainly
through its LIA policy, but financing through this
mechanism should be provided on a larger scale and
recognizing the difference between pre- and post-
restructuring situations.
In this effort, the IMF’s primary consideration
should be to guarantee that the debt burden is re-
duced to the point where a future default is a low
probability event for the debtor country. Since debt
sustainability analysis is not robust enough, debt
service capacity should be estimated taking into ac-
count that the margin of error may be large, so that
the “resource envelope” can be properly “adjusted”.
Paradoxically, it is the IMF’s attempt to encour-
age market-friendly debt restructurings which may
represent a real danger to the safeguarding of IMF’s
resources, because they may be often associated with
massive Fund support. In contrast, countries that
implement deeper haircuts will be more likely to be
able to repay the Fund.23 The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
Notes
1 This does not imply that the IMF was wrong in support-
ing Uruguay, whose economy has registered significant
improvement since 2003. We believe that supporting Uru-
guay was the right thing to do, even if we disagree with
the kind of debt restructuring that the IMF backed. It
simply means that the IMF did not do what it preaches.
It was inconsistent with it own proclaimed principles for
dealing with crises such as that in Uruguay in 2003.
2 This refers to the “deadweight” costs of a restructuring
process.
3 The enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
in 1976 with a restrictive interpretation of sovereign im-
munity is an example of this position.
4 However, his stated concerns about the costs borne by
American taxpayers because of the rescue packages are
unfounded. Middle-income countries have always hon-
oured their debts to the IMF.
5 25 January 2002. PO-3042. Treasury Secretary Paul H.
O’Neill Remarks to the Bond Market Association New
York City.
6 Lawyers, in particular, might benefit from the additional
“complexity” generated by the absence of a smoothly
functioning restructuring mechanism, which may be as-
sociated with higher fee income.
7 In contrast to the de facto protection that they may have,
as is discussed below.
8 Decisions by the DRF would not be subject to challenge
in domestic courts.
9 Debtor countries saw the possible advantages of the
SDRM, but their official position was against both the
SDRM and the widespread use of CACs, for fear of los-
ing reputation in the international financial markets.
Somewhat paradoxically, the result was that they would
speak on behalf of their creditors instead of voicing their
own concerns.
10 Of course, nobody assumed that bailouts would disap-
pear completely, but rather that their size and frequency
would be significantly reduced.
11 Creditors from G-7 countries complained that these coun-
tries’ representatives at the IMF’s Executive Board did
not take their interests into account.
12 The most important difference is that there is no equiva-
lent to the liquidation of a company in the sovereign
context. Moreover, liquidation law establishes the rela-
tive priorities among creditors both ex-post and ex-ante,
so it helps to resolve inter-creditor problems. Besides,
whereas bankruptcy law places legal constraints on the
company’s activities during the negotiation period, this
cannot be done in the sovereign context.
13 This is probably true. See Roubini and Setser (2004) and
the discussion below.
14 Quoted in Clarin, 23 February 2006, from hearing on
12 January.
15 In which a Belgian Court interpreted the pari passu clause
as requiring pro rata payments to all creditors, which
prevented Peru from making payments on its new bonds
(by blocking the payment through Euroclear) and led to
the country’s decision to pay the suing Elliot Fund.
16 The United States Attorney General also sent a “State-
ment of Interest” to judge Griesa in support of Argen-
tina.
17 According to it, if the creditor recovers part of its claims
through litigation before an SDRM restructuring agree-
ment, it only has a residual claim under that agreement
for the amount not yet recovered.
18 It is worth mentioning that the roll off of (long term)
bonds has not been the main factor behind recent crises
in emerging markets. In the cases of both Argentina and
Uruguay, for instance, bank runs were much more deci-
sive.
19 After Jean-Jacques Rey of the National Bank of Belgium,
who led the group established in 1995 by the Ministers
and Governors of the G-10 countries which worked on
proposals for the orderly resolution of sovereign debt
crisis.
20 The possible advantages of the alternative “statutory ap-
proach” were also considered, but it was deemed im-
practical.
21 As from March 2003 majority-restructuring provisions
have become standard in bonds governed by New York
law. They are likely to become the standard in German
law bonds too in the near future. See IMF (2005b).
22 These model clauses were developed jointly by the In-
stitute for International Finance, the Bond Market Asso-
ciation the Emerging Markets Creditors Association, the
Trade Association for the Emerging Markets, , the Inter-
national Securities Market Association, the International
Primary Market Association and the Securities Industry
Association. These creditor groups constitute what is
known as the “Gang of Seven”, which includes the seven
most important financial industry associations.
23 For a detailed comparison between the G-10 recommen-
dations and the private sector’s effective adoption of
CACs see Drage and Hovaguimian (2004).
24 Exit consents allow a qualified majority of bondholders
(usually 50 per cent or 66 per cent) to alter a bond non-
financial terms. They are used with the purpose of re-
ducing the attractiveness of the “old” bonds’. The most
common are the removal of the waiver of sovereign im-
munity, submission to jurisdiction, financial covenants
and listing.
25 As has been mentioned before, the framework also in-
cludes an emphasis on greater private sector involve-
ment, the encouragement of the use of collective action
clauses and the effective enforcement of access limits to
IMF lending. As originally envisaged it would have in-
cluded the SDRM.
26 This is not strictly true in every case. Sovereigns typi-
cally privilege certain kinds of debts, like, for example,
foreign bank’s (trade-related) credit lines to domestic
banks (which may also include public banks). As a con-
sequence, these have a de facto seniority and are often
partially rolled over, so they also represent DIP financ-
ing.
27 Though, in practice, it had already been implemented
before in exceptional cases. See Boughton (2001).
28 In principle, the Fund can only lend to countries that
have no arrears to their external creditors, be they pub-
lic or private, banks or bondholders. However, several
exceptions have been accepted to this so-called “non-
tolerance of arrears”. For example, the Fund can grant
an arrangement if it has sufficient assurances that soon
after its approval by the Board, Paris Club creditors will
agree with a new scheduling of their claims which is
compatible with filling the financing gap.24 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 40
29 These changes were not, as is well known, limited to the
sovereign debt market.
30 They were certainly “easier” but they never provided
much debt relief.
31 Given the enormous costs of default for the incumbent
government this concern seems to be unwarranted. How-
ever, and ironically, the possibility of creditor moral haz-
ard cannot be disregarded.
32 At the time the IMF was working on developing the
SDRM, LIA policy was seeing as a complement to it,
together with the inclusion of CACs in bond contracts.
33 Which build upon the principles that guided the opera-
tion of bank steering committees in the 1980s.
34 Obviously, the meaning of “appropriate” is highly sub-
jective, and despite the proclaimed efforts to achieve
greater “clarity” regarding the conditions for access to
IMF lending, this leaves ample room for discretion.
35 This does not refer to the SDRM but, as it should be
clear, to the principles mentioned in this section.
36 In the case of Argentina there was intense trading in the
secondary market in the months immediately preceding
the final restructuring agreement.
37 In the case of the IMF, being predictable is not necessar-
ily a virtue.
38 Even the need to strike this balance may be unfair on
equity considerations. Since the functioning of capital
markets is affected by a multitude of factors, and moral
hazard in relation to LIA policy does not seem to be a
first order problem (at the very least), this “balance”
should probably not be a primary consideration in the
formulation of that policy. LIA policy should, on aver-
age, be biased in favour of debtor countries.
39 LIA policy has also been applied in the cases of Domi-
nica and República Dominicana. The application of LIA
policy in low-income countries has been subject to spe-
cific considerations and will not be assessed in this paper.
40 This gives the IMF the necessary flexibility to accom-
modate to specific circumstances. That the IMF did not
take advantage of it with regard to the good faith crite-
rion may reflect that there was a deliberate attempt to
regain credibility by “punishing” Argentina.
41 For example, TFA (the Associazone per la Tutela degli
investitori in titoli Argentini) claimed to represent bond-
holders for free on the basis of a “mandato”. But mem-
bers of TFA were required to have clients holding Ar-
gentine bonds and to be active members of the Italian
Banking Association (ABI). There were reasons to be-
lieve that TFA represented the interests of the Italian
banks more than the interests of retail bondholders, to
whom they had sold Argentine bonds held in their own
investment portfolios in the run up to the crisis without
warning about the risks involved. The banks were wor-
ried about the legal risks from their dishonest behaviour
and recommended that retail investors reject Argentina’s
offer, which turned out to be a very bad advice. Those
who retained the bonds and “bottom fishers” who bought
to wrongly advised retail investors have made enormous
capital gains. Others self-appointed representatives of
retail investors collected significant amounts in fees with-
out “adding any value” to creditors, as they finally rec-
ommended to accept the offer (as was the case with
ABRA, headed by Adam Lerrick).
42 This became fully operational in February 2003. See IMF
(2004).
43 In the first months of 2002 the Argentine Government
asked for financial support to implement a gradualist pro-
gramme (a “shock” programme was out of the question
because of the extremely difficult political and social
situation). But, according to Claudio Loser (former Head
of the IMF’s Western Hemisphere Department), both
Kohler and Krueger were of the view that there would
only be support once Argentina had an “integral” pro-
gramme on track. The then president Duhalde said at the
time: “I do not see the way out. We have very low re-
serves, which are our only defense against an uncon-
trolled rise of the dollar. The IMF demands that we pay
with reserves. If we do it everything will blow up. If we
do not, then we will remain isolated and its also a disas-
ter”. Loser says that “(in the IMF) they wanted Argen-
tina to pay without any conditions”. Quoted from
Tenembaum (2004).
44 Argentina cancelled all its remaining obligations to the
Fund in early 2006.
45 Though by mid-2003 it should have already been obvi-
ous that the risks had been overestimated. The flawed
assessment of risks in Argentina were in no minor part
due to the wide-off-the-mark catastrophic “prophecies”
of IMF staff regarding future economic developments in
Argentina. In a prophecy worthy of Nostradamus, re-
vealed in a private conversation with a well-known Ar-
gentine economist in mid-2002, Anoop Singh (who was
then leading the IMF’s team working on Argentina) said
solemnly that “the markets have not been tested yet”,
referring to his view that the government’s “gradualistic”
monetary and banking policy would lead to high infla-
tion and capital flight. The opposite happened and inter-
est rates would drop sharply in the years following his
“prophecy”.
46 It is remarkable how in a just few years the Fund’s expo-
sure has decreased so much that may have generated the
opposite problem: a lack of enough “high yielding” as-
sets to cover its expenses.
47 Uruguay’s small economic size surely facilitated this.
48 According to Loser (Tenembaum, 2004), Kohler and
Krueger created an ad-hoc department that would deal
with the Argentine case so that Argentina would not be
treated under the usual criteria. He says: “... the reign of
the ayatollahs then began ...”. He also says “... the tradi-
tional approach would have suggested that the IMF sup-
port the country while it implemented the reforms nec-
essary to normalize the situation. The top leadership of
the IMF established a list of very hard reforms which the
country had to adopt even before negotiations would start”.
49 Again, talking about Koehler, Loser says (Tenembaum,
2004): “I believe Koehler is a religious man. He had a
completely moralistic view. He was a man according to
whose view Argentina should have repented and should
have suffered because of its sins ... Argentina had to pay
for what it had done”.
50 According to Loser (Tenembaum, 2004) this was “...
against the will of Koehler. He says it literally when he
signs: “they have forced me to do this”. In other words,
the G-7 decided to deprive (him) of authority”. Critics
of the decision questioned Argentina’s commitment to
implementing the macroeconomic policies needed to re-
store stability and emphasized the uncertainty as to the
potential inflationary consequences of the monetary pro-
gramme.25 The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings: Lending Into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainability Concerns
51 The usual practice is for the country to agree to budget
targets that define its capacity to repay its debt over the
life of the IMF programme. In the case of Argentina, the
“excess” primary surplus above the 3 per cent “floor”
was supposed to equal what Argentina had to agree to
pay its creditors.
52 Nor should it, if it is to be able to fulfil a positive con-
structive role in the international financial architecture.
53 Despite the fact that it had complied with the pro-
gramme’s fiscal and monetary targets.
54 The Argentine Government had decided not to pay if the
second review was not approved. Facing $3.2 billion in
payments coming due (equivalent to around 30 per cent
of central bank reserves), the Government feared that
reserves would fall below acceptable levels and made it
clear to the IMF that it was willing to default if neces-
sary. The risk was aggravated by the context of confron-
tation with the IMF, which could have had a negative
impact on domestic markets. In the end, the IMF “dis-
bursed” $3 billion.
55 It may, of course, be argued, from a “legalistic” point of
view, that the Fund did help Argentina, by partially “roll-
ing over” its debt with the multilateral institution. But
this was forced by the circumstances and was done re-
luctantly. Argentina would have probably defaulted on
its debt with the Fund if it had been required to pay on
an “expectation” basis.
56 Partly being financed by incurring in arrears.
57 In practice, when lending into arrears it is most likely
that the Fund will operate within two sets of (partly over-
lapping) constraints: the criteria guiding the implemen-
tation of LIA policy and the exceptional access frame-
work.
58 Relative to Uruguay’s economic size.
59 According to Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005) hair-
cuts were as low as 5 per cent in NPV terms, the lowest
of all recent sovereign debt restructurings. Kozack (2005)
concludes that it is not clear that Uruguay’s restructur-
ing has contributed to a restoration of debt sustainability.
This conclusion is probably an understatement, since it
appears in an IMF paper. Moreover, NPV calculations
are not sufficient to evaluate the degree of debt relief
generated by a restructuring and may be too sensible to
the specific discount rate chosen. Ultimately, debtors do
not pay the present value of the debt (unless they can
purchase it on the secondary market). They pay the full
nominal value as debts come due.
60 It is surprising to see how some economists were not
willing to acknowledge the obvious beneficial impact of
debt relief until quite recently. Thus, Peter Kenen (2003),
referring to the reason why there were no initiatives to
reduce the debt burden of LA countries in the 1980s says:
“... we did not have a convincing rationale for debt re-
duction –why it might stimulate growth. That had to wait
the arrival of what Krugman (1989) called the Debt Re-
lief Laffer Curve.”
61 This does not mean that the IMF should not have sup-
ported Uruguay’s restructuring. On the contrary, given
the country’s desperate situation at the time it was the
IMF’s duty as a multilateral organization to do as much
as possible to help it to avoid default. The point we are
trying to make is simply that the IMF was not consistent
with what it preaches and with its own principles as
embodied in the “framework for crisis prevention and
resolution”, and that its treatment of different countries
often depends on geopolitical considerations (in a broad
sense).
62 Largely because of the relatively high level of non par-
ticipation.
63 Not in the SDRM sense, but rather like a court in a na-
tional context.
64 A relevant result in the theoretical literature due to
Helpman (1989) is that uncoordinated voluntary debt
reduction will typically be sub-optimally low.
65 The correlations are not modelled.
66 Even “mere” data limitations may complicate the task.
67 The IMF’s DSAs have proved to be consistently over-
optimistic. See IMF (2003c).
68 It is interesting to note how much de private sector (and
the IMF) underestimated the value of Argentina’s GDP
warrants. They traded as low as 1.5 cents at the time of
the debt exchange and are trading at 9.5 cents at the time
of this writing.
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